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Cucinotta v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 35 (May 30, 2013)1 
 
TORTS – BUSINESS LAW 
 
Summary 
 
In an appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in a defamation case, the 
Court considered whether information divulged by a registered accounting firm in accordance 
with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is subject to an absolute privilege.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The Court affirmed the district court order, holding that those who are required by law to publish 
defamatory statements are absolutely privileged in making such statements so long as (1) the 
statements are communicated pursuant to a lawful process, and (2) the statements are 
communicated to a qualified person. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Respondents Deloitte & Touche, LLP, a registered accounting firm, and Larry Krause, a certified 
public accountant in their employ, performed a financial audit for Global Cash Access Holdings, 
Inc. (GCA), a company providing services to the gaming industry. During the course of an audit 
for another gaming client, Krause obtained an intelligence bulletin authored by the FBI that 
contained information about alleged illegal acts committed by GCA and two of its board 
members, appellants Robert Cucinotta and Karim Maskatiya. 
 
Due to the serious nature of the allegations, Deloitte contacted both the FBI and the DOJ to 
confirm their validity. Despite counsel from the DOJ advising against further dissemination of 
the bulletin, Deloitte felt compelled by federal securities law to disclose the allegations contained 
within the bulletin to GCA’s Audit Committee. Deloitte subsequently communicated these 
allegations during a conference call with the Audit Committee and requested that the audit 
committee conduct an independent investigation. 
 
GCA hired a national law firm to perform the investigation, and announced in a press release that 
its third quarter report would be delayed pending the results of an internal investigation. The 
investigation ultimately revealed no evidence of misconduct on the part of GCA, Cucinotta, or 
Maskatiya. However, as a result of the delayed third quarter report, GCA’s stock price 
significantly declined. Shortly thereafter, Cucinotta and Maskatiya resigned from GCA’s Board 
of Directors. 
 
Cucinotta and Maskatiya then filed a complaint for defamation and tortious interference against 
respondents Deloitte and Krause, based on the respondent’s communication of the contents of 
the FBI bulletin to GCA’s Audit Committee. After limited discovery, Deloitte and Krause filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing that their communications with the Audit Committee 
were either absolutely or conditionally privileged.  
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The district court granted the motion for summary judgment on both claims, finding that the 
communications were at least conditionally privileged on the basis that Cucinotta and Maskatiya 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Deloitte and 
Krause acted with actual malice. The district court also found that under federal securities law 
Deloitte and Krause had an affirmative duty to disclose the allegations contained in the bulletin, 
but found it unnecessary to determine whether the communications were absolutely privileged as 
a result of this duty. 
   
Discussion 
 
Justice Cherry wrote for an en banc court in which Chief Justice Pickering voluntarily recused 
herself. The Court, in its discretion, addressed the issue of whether the communications between 
Deloitte and GCA’s Audit Committee were absolutely privileged.  
 
Defamation may occur when a person publishes a false statement of fact.2 Nevertheless, certain 
defamatory communications are privileged because “the public interest in having people speak 
freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false 
and malicious statements.”3  Accordingly, Nevada law provides an absolute privilege to 
defamatory statements made during the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.4  
 
The Court held that this absolute privilege should also extend to communications published 
under law, and formally adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which 
provides that “one who is required by law to do an act does not incur any liability for doing it.”5 
However, the court cautioned that absolute privilege should only apply to a narrow set of 
circumstances because unfiltered speech to unintended persons could instigate malicious conduct 
that would go unpunished. Therefore, the Court held that communications made under the law 
only deserve absolute privilege when they are (1) made according to a lawful process and (2) 
communicated to a qualified person. 
 
The Court determined that Deloitte’s communications should be subject to absolute privilege. It 
reasoned that under federal law, when an accounting firm becomes aware of information that an 
illegal act has occurred or may occur, it must adequately inform the appropriate level of 
management,6 in this case GCA’s Audit Committee.  The Court concluded that the absolute 
privilege granted to these communications precluded the appellant’s claims of defamation and 
tortious interference, and therefore the district court’s grant of summary judgment was 
appropriate. 
  
Conclusion 
 
A party who is required by law to publish defamatory material is absolutely privileged to publish 
it, provided that the material is communicated to an appropriate party during a lawful process. 
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